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Abstract
The Troubles in Northern Ireland have played a prominent part in modern Euro-
pean history. Despite the success of the Peace Process in the 1990s and subse-
quent stabilisation of the conflict through the introduction of power-sharing and 
paramilitary  decommissioning of weapons, tensions still dominate the province. 
This thesis uses the Copenhagen School of Security  Studies to investigate proc-
esses of securitisation and desecuritisation that have taken place in Northern Ire-
land during the years of the Peace Process, in order to achieve a broader under-
standing of how key actors can help  shape the prospects for lasting peace and sta-
bility. Through an analysis of speech acts performed by political and religious 
leader Ian Paisley  between 1993 and 2007, two main securitisations are identified: 
the institutionalised securitisation of sectarian violence and the securitisation of 
unionist Ulster. Subsequently, an analysis of social practice identifies the introduc-
tion of power-sharing and de-escalation of violence as successful desecuritisa-
tions. The information gained through the analysis is further used to discuss 
whether, in order to be applicable to a wider range of cases, the Copenhagen 
School must increase its focus on facilitating conditions. Finally, focus is placed 
on the reconstruction of identities and othering, and how this might mitigate his-
torical animosities and facilitate lasting peace and stability.
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1. Introduction
Throughout history, Europe has been rife with conflicts caused by perceptions of 
nation, ethnicity and religion. One such conflict  that has been ongoing in different 
forms for centuries is the one in Northern Ireland, widely known as the Troubles. 
Outside the British Isles, the conflict is often regarded as being between Protes-
tants and Catholics. The situation is, however, vastly more complex in that the 
Northern Irish conflict is not a fight for provincial independence, as is often the 
case in similar conflicts. Rather, it is “ethnonational, a systematic quarrel between 
the political organisations of two communities who want their state to be ruled by 
their nation, or who want what they perceive as ‘their’ state to protect their na-
tion”1. In short, the conflict is about whether Northern Ireland should be a prov-
ince within the United Kingdom or become a part of the Republic of Ireland. 
At the time of writing, the conflict  in Northern Ireland has been stagnant for a 
number of years after a decade-long peace process resulted in agreements for po-
litical power-sharing and decommissioning of weapons by the paramilitary  group-
ings. Recent riots have, however, demonstrated that historical tensions are not eas-
ily  quelled, but nevertheless, there is a growing consensus from both sides that 
peace and stability cannot be achieved through violence.
An interesting theory to apply to any case where security issues are prevalent, 
is the Copenhagen School of Security  Studies. As a security theory, the Copenha-
gen School is known as widening2, since it adheres to an understanding of security 
as broader than just military, and poststructuralist, in that focuses on the intersub-
jective construction of security and threats through speech acts. Given this back-
ground, I seek to explore how threats have been articulated and perceived during 
the Peace Process and how this has been both facilitating and hindering to achiev-
ing lasting peace in Northern Ireland. 
1.1. Definitions of Concepts
There is a number of key concepts involved in this thesis that require initial elabo-
ration. Firstly, I refer to the Troubles as the, now concluded, violent conflict  that 
took place between the end of the 1960s and 2007 in Northern Ireland, with spil-
lover violence being perpetrated in both the Republic of Ireland and Great Britain. 
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Contrarily, I define the Northern Ireland Conflict as ongoing, due to the unre-
solved political situation as well as the tensions that still mar the province. 
I identify  the conflict  to be between two sides: the unionists who would like to 
retain the union with Britain and the nationalists3, who prefer Northern Ireland to 
join the Republic. These terms will be used when speaking of the non-violent po-
litical entities. Violent groups, such as the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF) or Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), will be referred to as loyalist and republican. The terms 
are somewhat interchangeable with unionist/nationalist, but are generally  accepted 
to refer to the more extreme fractions. Where religious affiliation is relevant, Prot-
estants and Catholics will also be used interchangeably with unionists and nation-
alists. 
I refer to the province of Northern Ireland as Northern Ireland, the Province or 
the North. When adapting unionist rhetoric, the term Ulster4 will used instead.  I 
understand Northern Ireland to be a part of the United Kingdom (UK), whereas 
Great Britain only refers to the island comprising England, Scotland and Wales. I 
will, however, use the term Britain in its everyday meaning to refer to the entire 
United Kingdom. The Republic of Ireland will be referred to as the Republic or 
the South. The name Ireland will only be used when referring to the entire isle. 
1.2. The Northern Ireland Conflict
1.2.1 Historical Summary
The relationship between the UK and the Republic of Ireland has been marred by 
strife for almost a millennium. By the 16th century, the entire island of Ireland was 
under the control of the English Tudor dynasty, and English culture, language and 
law had been imposed. In the 17th century, Protestant, and mostly Scottish, plant-
ers settled in Northern Ireland on lands confiscated from Irish chieftains, as part of 
a planned colonisation initiated by the British Crown5. Despite this attempted An-
glicisation of the island, and strict penal laws imposed on the Catholic majority, 
several rebellions took place throughout the following centuries, culminating in 
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3 Nationalist is here not to be confused with the term nationalism, which is used in its general mean-
ing and can apply  both to nationalists and unionists. 
4 The province of Ulster consists of nine counties, three of which are located in the Republic of Ire-
land. Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone belong to Northern Ireland 
whereas Cavan, Donegal and Monaghan are in the Republic. Consequently, the use of the term Ulster 
to refer to Northern Ireland is regarded as political given that the province does not encompass the 
entirety of Ulster (see Appendix 1). 
5 Coogan, Tim Pat (1996). The Troubles: Ireland’s Ordeal 1966-1995 and the Search for Peace. Lon-
don: Hutchinson, pp. 5ff.
the Easter Rising in Dublin 1916. The violent rebellion was put down by British 
forces in such a manner that  public opinion, which had not been supportive of the 
rebels at first, was swayed. The Irish War of Independence followed and conse-
quently, in 1921, the Irish Republic was given Commonwealth Dominion status 
and granted Home Rule through an agreement of partition in the Anglo-Irish 
Treaty6. This meant that the six counties in the North-East with a predominantly 
Protestant population remained under British rule, whereas the predominantly 
Catholic South became the Irish Free State. A civil war followed in the new Free 
State, between those who supported the status that Ireland was granted in the 
treaty and those who opposed partition and wanted full independence, with the 
former emerging as victors. Nevertheless, Ireland was granted full independence 
in 1937 and therethrough became the Republic of Ireland. The constitutional 
status of Northern Ireland as a part of the UK, however, remained unchanged7.  
In the 1960s, following several decades of relative peace, violence flared up in 
Northern Ireland, parallel to a civil rights movement that protested against  the dis-
crimination of the large minority group of Catholics. In continuation of this, the 
Troubles became an infected conflict between those wishing to stay  a part of the 
UK and those wishing to become a part of the Republic. Battles were fought po-
litically  and militarily between parties and paramilitary groups of loyalists and 
republicans. Republicans were mostly organised within the IRA, a paramilitary 
organisation with ties to the political party Sinn Féin. Loyalist insurgency, on the 
other hand, was somewhat more dispersed, with the UVF as the largest organisa-
tion. 
In 1969, the British Army was called in to protect and support the Royal Ulster 
Constabulary (RUC), and became an additional actor in the violent conflict8. A 
peace process was initiated in the 1980s, but despite this, the Troubles continued 
with a high level of sectarian violence up through the 1990s, until and even after 
the Belfast Agreement9 was signed in 1998. Republicans and loyalists decommis-
sioned their weapons in the early 2000s, but not until 2007 did the last British 
troops leave; which signalled the definite end of the Troubles. Despite the down-
scaling of sectarian violence, historic animosities and recent atrocities remain 
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7 Mitchell, Audra (2011). Lost in Transformation: Violent Peace and Peaceful Conflict in Northern 
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8 Weitzer, Ronald (1987). “The Struggle over British Security Policy in Northern Ireland” Compara-
tive Politics, 19(3), 281-298.
9 The Belfast Agreement is also known as the Good Friday Agreement.
fresh in the minds of the population. Also, acts of sectarian violence do still occur, 
which further emphasises an unresolved atmosphere of distrust10.
1.2.2. The Reverend Dr. Ian Paisley
Ian Paisley  was born in 1926 and grew up  in County  Antrim in Northern Ireland. 
At an early age, he received a religious vocation and consequently received his 
first congregation at the age of nineteen11. In 1951, he founded the Free Presbyte-
rian Church of Ulster, an evangelical denomination adhering to the fundamental 
doctrines of Christianity. As the Troubles started and violence erupted through the 
1960s, he organised counter-demonstrations against the Catholic civil rights 
marches and took part in riots12. In 1971, he was one of the founding members of 
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), which was established out of a perceived 
need to defend Protestantism13. The party  claims to represent traditional unionism, 
and has been controlled by individuals with “strongly conservative religious be-
liefs” 14 from the very beginning. Paisley remained the party  leader until 2008 and 
stepped down from religious ministry in 2012. 
My reason for focusing on Ian Paisley is primarily due to his unique status of 
being both an influential religious leader as well as an influential political lead-
er15. Because of this dual role he has been one of the most controversial figures in 
Northern Ireland during the past five decades and is known for his flamboyant 
rhetoric16. He is thus in the required position of authority to be able to facilitate a 
successful securitisation17. Although he has now stepped down from his official 
duties, Paisley’s ideas continue to exert considerable influence on the political and 
religious situation in Northern Ireland18 and the DUP is today the largest party in 
Northern Ireland with their current leader, Peter Robinson, in the position of First 
Minister.
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sity Press, pp. 24
12 Jordan, Richard L. (2011). “The ‘Prophet’ of Interposition: The Reverend Ian Paisley and Ameri-
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tory. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 120
14 Southern, Neil (2005). “Ian Paisley and evangelical Democratic Unionists: An analysis of the role 
of evangelical Protestantism within the Democratic Unionist Party” Irish Political Studies, 20(2), 
127-145, pp. 130
15 Bruce, 2007:1
16 Weitzer, 1987:288
17 Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver & Jaap de Wilde (1998). Security: A New Framework for Analysis. 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, pp. 31ff
18Jordan, 2011:63
1.3. Relation to Previous Research
Traditionally, research within security studies has focused on military threats. 
However, in the 1980s, with the theoretical advancement of constructivism, secu-
rity  came to be regarded as a term which gained its meaning through social con-
text19. On this background, Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver, who are often credited 
as the main initiators of the Copenhagen School, developed a framework for ana-
lysing the intersubjective construction of threats through speech acts. The 
concepts of desecuritisation and, in particular, securitisation have been applied to 
a myriad of issues ranging from migration20  to HIV21  to conflicts and revolu-
tions22. 
In regard to security  studies and the case of Northern Ireland, academic focus 
has primarily been on issues such as counter-terrorism23, statebuilding and power-
sharing in divided societies24 and the relation between violence, peace and conflict 
transformation25. Whilst  DUP discourses in relation to the Peace Process have 
been analysed by Ganiel26, little, if any, research has been published using the Co-
penhagen School framework to analyse the processes of securitisation and desecu-
ritisation during the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. It is therefore an explicit 
aim of this thesis to explore the applicability of the Copenhagen School frame-
work of securitisation and desecuritisation to the articulation and performance of 
the Peace Process in Northern Ireland. 
1.4. Delimitations
There are a number of delimitations to take note of in this thesis. Firstly, the focus 
is on one key  actor, Ian Paisley, and his rhetoric. I neither analyse the Northern 
Ireland conflict nor the Peace Process and its consequences per se. I am aware that 
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19 Sheehan, 2005:43
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Routledge.
21 Elbe, Stefan (2006). “Should HIV/AIDS be securitized? The Ethical Dilemmas of Linking HIV/
AIDS and Security” International Studies Quarterly, 50(1), 119-144;  Elbe, Stefan (2007). “HIV/
AIDS and Security” in Alan Collins (ed.), Contemporary Security Studies. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 331-346.
22 Wilkinson, Claire (2007). “The Copenhagen School on Tour in Kyrgyzstan: Is Securitization The-
ory Usable Outside Europe” Security Dialogue. 38(1), 5-25.
23 Bigo, Didier & Emmanuel-Pierre Guittet (2011). “Northern Ireland as Metaphor: Exception, Sus-
picion and Radicalization in the ‘War on Terror’” Security Dialogue, 42(6), 483-498.
24 Kerr, Michael (2006). Imposing Power-Sharing: Conflict and Coexistence in Northern Ireland and 
Lebanon. Dublin: Irish Academic Press.
25 Mitchell, 2011
26 Ganiel, Gladys (2007). “‘Preaching to the Choir?’ An Analysis of DUP Discourses about the 
Northern Ireland Peace Process” Irish Political Studies, 22(3), 303-320.
a large number of actors played a significant role in the process and continue to do 
so, but it is beyond my scope to elaborate in detail upon their role. Secondly, it 
should also be noted that, whilst I do attempt to identify all Paisley’s articulated 
securitising moves, the empirical material is limited, and therefore cannot repre-
sent the totality of Paisley’s opinions. Owing to the performative nature of desecu-
ritisation, it is beyond the theoretical and empirical scope to identify  all possible 
desecuritisations. A third delimitation is the subjective nature of the conducted 
research, owing to my social constructivist paradigm. Whilst I do not determine 
whether the security problems are objective, I do define whether securitisations 
have taken place27  and thus, the study is a reflection of an intersubjectively  con-
structed reality. 
A general limitation of case studies is the weak capability of estimating the 
causal effects between variables28. My aim in this thesis is not to uncover a cau-
sality. It would be impossible to prove that  the changed rhetoric of Ian Paisley was 
the only  reason for the stabilisation of the conflict, or contrarily  that the de-
escalation of violence altered Paisley’s rhetoric. Additionally, there are several 
factors that may not be taken into in-depth consideration, such as the practical dif-
ference between being a governing party and being in opposition. Consequently, I 
will argue that there are parallels and connections between levels of violence, 
election results and speech acts, but cannot claim a final causality or correlation.
1.5. Research Question 
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate the processes of securitisation and 
desecuritisation that have taken place in Northern Ireland during the years of the 
Peace Process and therefrom achieve an understanding of how speech and per-
formative acts by  key actors can shape a political process and prospects for lasting 
peace and stability. As such, my research question is: 
How have processes of securitisation and desecuritisation, as expressed by 
Ian Paisley between 1993 and 2007, reflected and/or contributed to the 
changes in the political and societal situation in Northern Ireland and facili-
tated peace and stability?
I work with two hypotheses regarding the success of the securitising moves and 
desecuritisation attempts. Firstly, that Ian Paisley was successful in securitising 
10
27 Buzan et al., 1998:34
28 George, Alexander L. & Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 27
the Belfast Agreement as a threat to Ulster’s existence since, in the aftermath of 
the treaty, the DUP became the largest party  in Northern Ireland. Secondly, that 
the conflict between unionists and nationalists has been desecuritised and thus 
moved from being a security issue to a political issue, through performative acts 
such as power-sharing and decommissioning. 
1.6. Structure of Thesis
This study commences with a discussion of the ontological and epistemological 
foundations of the Copenhagen School of Security Studies and proceeds to pre-
sent its most important  elements; explaining the concepts of securitisation, dese-
curitisation and sector analysis. Further, my methodology  is presented. On the 
basis of Norman Fairclough’s Critical Discourse Analysis, I explain its relevance 
to this study  and describe my method of analysis in detail. I continue with an 
analysis of Paisley’s speech acts during the past fourteen years, and present my 
identified securitising moves. In addition, I situate his speeches in the temporal 
context of the conflict and thus identify  an institutionalised securitisation as well 
as desecuritisations. Finally, I discuss the implications of my results for the Co-
penhagen School, in particular in regard to defining the moment of when a secu-
ritisation becomes successful. I also elaborate on how the concept of othering can 
be explicated in the theory and how this can be used to, in practice, facilitate a 
lasting and stable peace in the province. 
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2. Theory
This thesis will primarily build upon the theoretical framework of securitisation 
and desecuritisation as proposed by the Copenhagen School and its critics and de-
velopers. The theory is especially  relevant to apply  to the case of Northern Ireland 
since it allows for an investigation of elements that may  contribute to the escala-
tion and de-escalation of a conflict, and the role played by  key  actors in defining 
the situation. 
2.1. Ontology and Epistemology
In line with the Copenhagen School, I adhere to a social constructivist understand-
ing of security. The school denies an objectivist understanding of security. Thus, 
in the debate between traditionalists, who claim the content of security to be fixed: 
“military security against the military  security  of other states”29, and wideners, 
who see security as a broader concept, capable of encompassing several levels of 
analysis and different ontological understandings of threats, it  positions itself 
amongst the wideners. The Copenhagen School can be defined as reflexivist, as 
opposed to positivist, and is characterised by its constructivist, and therefore anti-
essentialist nature. Hence, reality  may exist, but is not accessible to be analysed 
objectively and therefore, we cannot scientifically  determine the reality of a 
threat30. This is not to say  that security  is a purely subjective construction. Instead, 
threats, and thus securitisation, are constructed intersubjectively in language and 
actions between actors31. For the analyst, it  is neither a possibility nor task to step 
outside the social reality  to determine the existence of an ‘objective’ reality or 
threat32. It is therefore important to acknowledge that the results of this study will 
not comprise an objective truth, but that it should be regarded as an unavoidably 
subjectivist interpretation of the dialectism between speech acts, discursive and 
social practices.
Through this focus on how meaning is created in interaction, knowledge is 
gained epistemologically. Meaning is thus created through the social, which 
serves as the basis of knowledge33. The most important form of interaction is un-
derstood to be language, as demonstrated through the focus on speech acts. In so-
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means to be a post-structural realist” 4th annual CEEISA convention, University of Tartu, 25-27, pp.3
31 Buzan et. al., 1998:30
32 ibid.:33
33 Burr, Vivien (1995). An Introduction to Social Constructivism. London: Sage.
cial constructivism however, norms, identities and values also constitute important 
forms of interaction through which meaning is created34. The contingency of these 
reality-shaping factors further establishes the theory’s anti-essentialist nature. 
2.2. The Copenhagen School of Security Studies 
The Copenhagen School of Security  Studies consists of three main elements: se-
curity sectors, securitisation and the theory of regional security complexes. The 
latter is not relevant to the subject  matter of this thesis, and will thus not be further 
elaborated upon. Whereas securitisation is the main process adhered to by the 
school, much academic debate has taken place regarding the process of desecuriti-
sation, which is mentioned but not fully conceptualised by  the school’s creators35. 
For the purpose of this thesis, I will apply Lene Hansen’s conceptualisations of 
four ideal type desecuritisations: change through stabilisation, replacement, rear-
ticulation, and silencing to my analysis of Ian Paisley’s speech acts. 
2.2.1. Securitisation
At the core of the inner logic of security is the concept of survival36. Thus, the 
logic of survival in the face of threats drives securitisation. Securitisation occurs 
when a securitising actor performs a speech act  in which they articulate an object 
or a phenomenon as an existential threat toward a referent object, in an attempt to 
move an issue from a communicative political sphere to one where measures can 
be taken to eliminate the threat. In order for the securitisation to be successful, it 
must be accepted as such by an audience who thereby legitimises the use of ex-
traordinary measures. The Copenhagen School is somewhat unclear regarding ex-
actly what securitisation refers to; whether it is the referent object or the threat  
itself that is securitised. I define securitisation as referring to the actual process 
and consequently, both the threat and referent object can be perceived to be secu-
ritised. The process of securitisation is illustrated in Figure 2.1.
The concept of audience accept is especially  important, for without it an issue 
cannot be claimed to be successfully  securitised; instead a securitising move has 
taken place. One should also note that extraordinary measures do not necessarily 
have to be adopted for a securitisation to be successful; audience accept is suffi-
13
34 Esmark, Anders, Carsten Bagge Laustsen & Niels Åkerstrøm Andersen (2005). “Socialkonstruk-
tivistiske analysestrategier - en introduktion” in Esmark, Anders, Carsten Bagge Laustsen & Niels 
Åkerstrøm Andersen (eds.), Sociakonstruktivistiske analysestrategier. Frederiksberg: Roskilde 
Universitetsforlag/Samfundslitteratur, 7-30, pp.11
35 Hansen, Lene (2012). “Reconstructing desecuritisation: the normative-political in the Copenhagen 
School and directions for how to apply it” Review of International Studies, 38(3), 526-546.
36 Buzan et. al., 1998:27
cient37. The concept of audience does, however, provide a problem for the school, 
in that there is an unclarity in regard to which audience is the most  relevant and 
when the audience is persuaded to accept a securitising move38. This, however, 
also mirrors the reflexivist epistemology  of the school, wherein the analyst is in a 
position to define when a securitisation has taken place. 
The securitising move takes place through a linguistic articulation, known as a 
speech act. In order for a speech act to work, a certain number of facilitating con-
ditions must be met. These fall into two categories: “the internal linguistic-
grammatical - to follow the rules of an act” and “the external, contextual and so-
cial - to hold a position from which the act can be made”39. Internally, the speech 
act must be articulated in a way  that can be understood linguistically  by an audi-
ence using a language of security. Externally, the actor must first possess author-
ity, or social capital in order to be accepted as a securitising actor. Secondly, the 
threat itself can be articulated as existential if references can be made to objects 
that are generally  perceived to be threatening40. Other factors, such as norms and 
14
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38 Stritzel, Holger (2007). “Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and Beyond” European 
Journal of International Relations, 13(3), 357-383, pp. 363; McDonald, Matt (2008). “Securitization 
and the Construction of Security” European Journal of International Relations, 14(4), 563-584, pp. 
566
39 Austin 1975[1962] in Buzan et. al., 1998:32
40 Buzan et. al., 1998:33
Figure 2.1. Adapted from Buzan et al., 1998:23ff
identities based upon historical enmities do not necessarily contribute to the 
speech act, but also act as external facilitating conditions, wherein the chance of 
successful securitisation occurring is increased41. The inclusion of facilitating 
conditions has, however, also been subject to criticism. There are claims that con-
text has been downplayed within the Copenhagen School, in particular because 
facilitating conditions do not encompass an inherent part of the framework, where 
the focus is “on the performative role of the speech act rather than the conditions 
in which securitization itself becomes possible”42. Hence, an increased focus on 
facilitating conditions and context as an integral part  of successful securitisation 
could improve its applicability  to cases where other elements of securitisation are 
not as evident. 
It is important to distinguish between the units involved in a security analysis. 
Firstly, the referent object is what is “seen to be existentially  threatened and that 
[has] a legitimate claim to survival”43. Secondly, the securitising actor securitises 
a particular issue by  claiming that the referent object is existentially threatened. 
The distinction between referent object and security  actor can sometimes seem 
unclear as actors often speak as representatives of the referent object they aim to 
securitise. Yet, due to the socially constructed nature of any referent object, these 
can only exist intersubjectively and thus have no essence allowing them to ‘speak’ 
for themselves. Theoretically, it could be possible for any actor to securitise any 
referent object. However, constraints created by facilitating conditions do limit the 
amount of successful securitisations. 
It is also possible for securitisations to become institutionalised. Institutional-
ised securitisations often rely on a social practice of violence and conflict but 
could also be the product of “repeated audience acceptances atrophying into a set 
of institutionalised practices”44. Consequently, a successful securitisation can be 
accomplished by invoking words that are intricately tied to such institutionalised 
issues, without having to elaborate on why they constitute a security  issue45. Thus, 
if an issue such as IRA terrorism is already accepted as a major security issue, 
linkage of other issues to this concept will immediately  result in them being ac-
cepted as security issues, regardless of their nature.
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The defining moment of when a securitisation is successful can also be con-
tested. There is an inherent paradox in that a successful securitisation does not re-
quire extraordinary  measures to be implemented, only accepted by an audience, 
owing to difficulties in defining when such an audience accept occurs. In addition, 
focusing on the specific moment when implementation of extraordinary  measures 
is legitimised does not add to our understanding of why implementation becomes 
possible in that particular moment46. This brings us back to the discussion of con-
text and facilitating conditions that will be given added importance in my analysis 
in order to achieve a greater understanding of why the expected processes of secu-
ritisation and desecuritisation have taken place. 
2.2.2. Desecuritisation
Desecuritisation is the process wherein an issue loses its status as securitised and 
moves toward the politicised, or in rare cases even non-politicised. Desecuritisa-
tion is performative, and does not necessarily occur through speech acts47. Whilst 
securitisation has been extensively theorised, the process of desecuritisation is 
comparatively  underdeveloped. However, Wæver himself does assert that there 
are three methods to desecuritise an issue: either one can not speak of it, not use 
extraordinary  measures for an issue that  has already been securitised or move is-
sues back to the sphere of normal politics48. Several other authors have also con-
tributed to the debate with various methods and strategies of desecuritisation, in 
particular in regard to minority rights and migration49.
In continuation of these debates, Hansen has argued that there are four different 
methods of desecuritisation that encompass most empirical cases50: 
1. Change through stabilisation: a move out of an explicit security discourse 
to a less violent form of politics.
2. Replacement: one issue moves out of security whilst another is simultane-
ously securitised.
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3. Rearticulation: a security issue is resolved through an active political solu-
tion.
4. Silencing: an issue is non-politicised and fails to register or disappears 
completely from both the political and security agenda.
It is important  to note that these are ideal types and are hence not mutually ex-
clusive. Consequently, one could recognise several different modes of desecuriti-
sation within one empirical case.
2.2.3. Security Sectors
In Security: A New Framework for Analysis, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde identify 
five sectors of security: the military, economic, environmental, societal and politi-
cal. Each of these sectors differ in regard to their referent objects, actors and lo-
gics of existential threat. Since neither the environmental nor economic sectors 
have much relevance to this perspective on the Northern Irish conflict, I will not 
elaborate further on them. Recently, there has been much debate on the inclusion 
of a religious sector, in order to encompass elements that cannot be accommo-
dated within the societal or military sectors, where religious conflicts are often 
identified to belong51 . Owing to the ethnic/religious nature of the Northern Irish 
conflict, I will therefore argue to include religion as a sector in its own right. 
The Military Sector
The military sector is the closest to traditional notions of what security  entails. 
The referent object here is typically the state, which is securitised by its govern-
ment or other military authority. Existential threats are understood as military in 
nature, often involving violence. The referent object can, however, also consist of 
a non-state unit. In the case of Northern Ireland, which is not a state per se, the 
presence of British soldiers and the violence perpetrated by  loyalist paramilitaries 
were perceived as a threat by  Catholic/nationalist communities, whereas the vio-
lence by  IRA and other republican paramilitaries were perceived as military 
threats by and to Protestant/unionist communities. In such cases, the referent ob-
jects are not states, but the perceived threat is still military.
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The Societal Sector
The referent object in the societal sector is widely understood to be the somewhat 
vague concept of identity, often conceptualised as an imagined community52. Such 
communities are constituted through identities, norms and customs and can vary 
in size between the individual and the global. Common issues perceived as threats 
to identity are migration, horizontal competition - when a community's culture is 
threatened by external cultural and linguistic influences - and vertical competition 
- where an integrating project pulls people towards an either wider or narrower 
identity 53. The concept of identity  as a referent object has been criticised since it 
essentialises identity in a way  that contradicts the social constructivist ontology  of 
the school, thus ignoring that identity is a constant negotiation54. One could, how-
ever, also argue that whereas the fluidity of identity  is a valid claim, identities are 
often sedimented as discourses, and can thus function as referent objects for secu-
rity 55.
The Political Sector
Within the political sector, the referent object is typically state sovereignty, or in 
the Northern Irish case, the possibility  to independently choose affiliation. Thus, 
“political security  is about the organisational stability of the social order(s)” and 
the perceived threats are non-military in nature56. This can be illustrated by how 
many unionists perceived Ulster to be threatened by  the Republic’s constitution 
from 1937, which claimed that the six counties of the North were a part of the Re-
public of Ireland rather than the UK57. Also, the referent object of state sover-
eignty can be perceived as threatened by external power-sharing agreements, 
where foreign states are given access to the political system of a state. 
The Religious Sector
The religious sector is not (yet) an inherent part of the Copenhagen School. Relig-
ion as a referent object is often treated as an identity, and as such, placed within 
the societal sector. When it  is regarded as a threat, as is the case of religious ter-
rorism, it is instead placed within the military sector. However, there are elements 
of religion that cannot be explained by the secular; namely the referent object of 
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faith. Faith is distinguished from other nodes of identity  in that it cannot be ex-
plained by  referring to discourses of rationality, since it is subject to belief despite 
doubt. It is related to the metaphysical conflict between good and evil58. The very 
concept of being is what  is at stake: “the true faith, our possibility to worship  the 
right gods the right way and - in some religions - thereby have the chance of sal-
vation”59. It is this perception of the sacred, which constitutes the very essence of 
existence, that can result in the securitisation of religion60. Also, whereas religion 
does to some extent constitute an identity, it  is a part of the identity that  is deeply 
engrained and unchangeable, and can therefore be differentiated from other forms 
of identity 61.
The sectors should not be treated as closed systems, as there are a large number 
of cross-linkages between them62. Actual security actors do not necessarily securi-
tise consciously  within one sector: rather, sector analysis is a framework for iden-
tifying and analysing elements that result in a successful or failed securitisation. 
States as referent objects appear in several sectors, as do various other referent  
objects such as nations and other imagined communities, despite seeming clearly 
rooted within one. Consequently, sectors are interrelated in the securitisation 
process and should not be regarded as separate63.
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3. Methodology
This section describes and explains the methodology and methods I will apply  to 
this study. Firstly, I will present the theoretical foundation and inspiration for my 
research method, namely Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) as developed by 
Norman Fairclough. Secondly, I will discuss the methodology of the single-case 
study, and its implications for the contributions that this thesis can make, as well 
as motivations for my choice of empirical sources. Finally, I will describe the spe-
cific methods used to analyse the presented empirical material. 
3.1. Critical Discourse Analysis
Since the Copenhagen School understands the defining criterion of security  to be 
textual, discourse analysis is an obvious method to use in uncovering how some-
thing is established as a security threat64. This discourse analysis will follow along 
the lines of the method presented by  Buzan et. al. where discourse is studied “as a 
subject in its own right, not as an indicator of anything else” without the use of 
any “sophisticated linguistic or quantitative techniques”65. In addition, my analy-
sis will be inspired by the premises of CDA as introduced by Norman Fairclough. 
CDA can contribute to the theorising of the method of identifying securitising 
speech acts in that discursive practices are seen as inherent to social practice and 
contribute to the construction of the social world66. Its aim is consequently to shed 
light on the linguistic-discursive dimension of social and cultural phenomena and 
processes of change67.
According to Fairclough, discourse is shaped in language and both constitutes 
and is constituted by social reality 68. Thus, language both shapes the construction 
of an external social world, but is also shaped by it. In terms of action, language 
can be seen as a social activity used to create meaning as well as a mode of action 
that can be acted upon69. This is in keeping with discourse being in a dialectical 
relationship  with social practice70. The dialectical relationship  is especially impor-
tant in my motivations for applying CDA to the Copenhagen School since it  al-
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lows for a study  of the consequences of language use and acknowledges a social 
world that is not necessarily discursively  constructed, but, instead, socially con-
structed and thus adheres to the same ontology. 
Discursive practice is manifested in its linguistic form, through written or spo-
ken texts71. These are always placed within a particular social practice, which 
does not constitute part of the discourse. It is important to note that the text in it-
self does not equal discursive practice, but rather, that discursive practice acts as a 
mediator between texts and social practice. Thus, texts shape and are shaped by 
social practice through discursive practice72. This means that Paisley’s speeches in 
themselves do not constitute a discursive practice, but that it is through discursive 
practice that their textual meaning can be analysed. Parallel to my  theoretical se-
curitisation framework, I claim that the securitising moves, articulated through the 
linguistic content of Paisley's speeches, constitute the discursive practices in this 
study. The social practice, on the other hand, is constituted by  institutional prac-
tices and norms73. This also conforms directly  with the Copenhagen School's un-
derstanding of historical, social and political contexts as facilitating conditions for 
the success of a securitising speech act. Ergo, discourse depends on the “nature of 
the social practice and conjuncture of social practices it is placed within, and on 
how it figures within them”74.
The element of power plays an important role within CDA inasmuch that dis-
course is constituted through power and becomes a controlling force that can en-
force particular subject positions on individuals and groups75. It is also in this un-
derstanding of power and hegemony that the critical element of CDA becomes 
apparent. In essence, analysts try  to understand which “structures, strategies or 
other properties of text, talk, verbal interaction or communicative events play a 
role in these modes of reproduction”76. In exploring the reproduction of power 
relationships, the analyst can also challenge dominance. Methodologically, this 
involves a top-down approach, similar to that of the Copenhagen School, where 
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the “symbolic power”77 of elites allow them special access to discourse, therein 
affording actors in positions of power the opportunity to define security 78. 
The reflexivist nature of CDA also raises issues regarding the position of the 
analyst. CDA is a subjective method, where the interpretation of speech acts is 
done by the analyst, who, according to social constructivist epistemological defi-
nition, does not have access to an objective reality  independent of thought and ex-
perience. Thus, the interpretation of my analytical results does run a risk of being 
biased due to my personal experiences and opinions regarding the Northern Irish 
conflict and Peace Process. However, this does not necessarily  have problematic 
implications, since experience of circumstances may  help to provide an under-
standing of context and social practice79. In fact, Fairclough's CDA is inherently 
normative in that it, taking inspiration from Marxism, asserts that it  is important 
for analysts not to automatically  or unconsciously reproduce the ruling political 
climate. Rather, there should be a normative political commitment from the ana-
lyst80. Despite discussions and critique to the contrary81, the Copenhagen School 
also allows for an amount of reflexive normativity from the side of the analyst be-
cause, whilst it is not up to the analyst to determine the reality of a security threat, 
the analyst does determine whether securitisation has actually taken place82. 
3.2. The Single-Case Study
For the purpose of this thesis, I will apply a qualitative single-case study ap-
proach. The great advantage of a case study is that it offers an opportunity for in-
tensive in-depth analysis even when the resources for research are limited83. De-
pending on the purpose of one's study, there are a number of established methods 
for choosing cases to study. It is often argued that cases should be chosen through 
22
77 Bourdieu, Pierre (1997) [1989]. Af praktiske grunde: Omkring teorien om menneskelig handlen. 
København: Hans Reitzel.
78  Van Dijk, 2001:303; Buzan et al., 1998:31
79 Fairclough, 1992:36
80 Wetherell, Margaret (2001). “Debates in Discourse Research” in Margaret Wetherell, Stephanie 
Taylor & Simeon J. Yates (eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. London: Sage Publica-
tions in Association with The Open University, 380-399, pp. 380
81 Booth, Ken (1991). “Security and Emancipation” Review of International Studies, 17(4), 313-326; 
Paris, Roland (2001). “Human Security: Paradigm Shift of Hot Air?” International Security, 26(2), 
87–102; Shepherd, Laura J (2007). “‘Victims, Perpetrators and Actors' Revisited: Exploring the Po-
tential for a Feminist Reconceptualisation of (International) Security and (Gender) Violence” The 
British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 9(2), 239-256; Hansen, Lene (2000). “The Lit-
tle Mermaid's Silent Security Dilemma and the Absence of Gender in the Copenhagen School” 
Millennium-Journal of International Studies, 29(2), 285-306.
82 Buzan et. al., 1998:33f
83 Lijphart, Arend (1971). “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method”, The American Po-
litical Science Review, 65(3), 682-693, pp. 691
their ability to stand for a population, and that generalisation is, or should be, the 
aim of case-study research84. This claim has, however, been contested. 
Flyvbjerg argues that it is possible to generalise on the basis of a single-case 
study, but also that “formal generalization is overvalued as a source of scientific 
development, whereas ‘the force of example’ is underestimated”85. In addition, 
case studies can be especially  useful if aspiring to explore standards for judging 
whether some generalisations are more applicable than others86. According to 
Flyvbjerg, cases can either be chosen because they present an interesting case in 
themselves, or because one has an ambition to generalise the results. 
My case has been chosen primarily due to its interesting character as it is a case 
that has filled the debates and had severe human consequences for several genera-
tions of British, Irish and Northern Irish. I would argue that the case of the North-
ern Irish conflict contains unique elements in that  it  is partly  ethnic, partly  nation-
alistic, partly religious, as well as being primarily about which entity of nation-
state to belong to, rather than a nation seeking independence87.
These elements of uniqueness bring into question whether the conclusions of 
my analysis could be applicable to other cases, and if so, which elements might 
consequently be used as a basis for further investigation. It is an explicit aim of 
this thesis to contribute to the debates surrounding the Copenhagen School in re-
gard to what constitutes successful securitisations and desecuritisations. Indeed, 
single-case studies can often be useful in theory development88. Paisley's rhetoric 
through the past one and a half decades when the Peace Process in Northern Ire-
land has been ongoing, does not present an easy case for securitisation theory 89. 
Above all, the required element of emergency measures is rarely articulated, thus 
leading up to a post-analysis discussion of whether this element is indeed crucial 
to the theory. In addition, the parallel processes of desecuritisation as defined by 
Lene Hansen that I aim to explore have not been extensively tested. Thus, despite 
the uniqueness of the totality of the case, I believe that there are also several ele-
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ments within it that could provide useful and generalisable results in regard to 
these specific processes in other conflicts. 
3.2.3. Empirical Sources
In order to analyse speech acts, the chosen texts must have been spoken or ex-
pressed at some point, since it is the act of speech itself, and not hidden intentions, 
that constitutes the social reality of the threats. I have chosen to analyse speeches 
given by Ian Paisley between 1993 and 2007 because they temporally cover the 
two main peace treaties that resulted in the stabilisation of the Northern Irish con-
flict and the end of the Troubles. Ian Paisley and the DUP were not positively in-
clined towards these agreements at the time, yet today express pride regarding the 
stabilisation that has been achieved and the pluralism of Northern Irish society. 
The texts have been chosen through a search of transcribed speeches given by 
Ian Paisley, available at the Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)90. The par-
ticular speeches given by Paisley  to the DUP at the annual conferences were cho-
sen mainly for two reasons; firstly there was an uninterrupted range of speeches 
from 1993 to 2001, and then further from 2004 and 2006. This allows for added 
consistency, since the audience remains the same. Thus the expected change in 
speech acts that takes place over time cannot be attributed to a change of audi-
ence. Secondly, the speeches are made at a party conference and are therefore re-
ported medially, thus introducing the statements to the public sphere. Thirdly, the 
primary context is political and not religious, giving room for an analysis of how 
religious language is used to emphasise political aims. Whilst  it would be in keep-
ing with the orthodoxy of the Copenhagen School to explore the process of secu-
ritisation using no more than one speech, the reason for this large number is above 
all to explore how securitising moves and desecuritisations can change over time 
and the influence that this can have on the social reality  lived by those in the midst 
of the conflict. 
In order to fully  include the period of the last decade, where the Peace Process 
has resulted in a new political constellation, a small number of other speeches 
given in other settings have been included91. Additionally, given that the historical 
and cultural contexts are significant in a securitisation analysis, I will also make 
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use of secondary sources in order to explore and discuss discourses of politics, 
culture, history, and identity of Northern Ireland.  
3.3. Methods of Analysis
3.3.1. Methods of Speech Act Analysis
Methodologically, CDA entails performing a concrete linguistic textual analysis 
on the semantics of social interaction. It is beyond the scope of this thesis to per-
form a thorough linguistic analysis and coding of the entire content of the 
speeches. Instead, each speech will be read keeping in mind a search for security 
arguments that  adhere to the aforementioned security  logic of the Copenhagen 
School. These findings are subsequently investigated in regard to the referent ob-
ject(s), the articulated threat(s) and their connection to security  sectors, as well as 
the social, historical and political context at the time of the speech. In sum, my 
method is simple: to read and look for arguments that take “the rhetorical and 
logical form defined here as security”92. The analysis will be guided by a search 
for the specific articulations demonstrated in Table 3.1.
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Element Question(s) Examples
Referent Object What is being threatened? 
Whose survival is at stake?
State sovereignty, a 
community/nation, a relig-
ion, etc.
Existential Threat What does the threat entail? Bodily harm, inability to 
practice religion, loss of 
freedoms and/or independ-
ence, centralisation of 
government, etc. 
Enemy Who is exerting the threat? A different state’s military, 
terrorists, religion, external 
legislation, etc.
Audience Who is the intended audience of 
the speech act with the power to 
legitimise extraordinary meas-
ures?
The general public, legisla-
tors, community members, 
the military, etc. 
Extraordinary 
Measures
Which measures are suggested 
in order to curb the threat?
Military action, personal 
defence, state of exception, 
removal of democratic 
rights, etc.
Table 3.1.
The rhetorical imagery of the speeches will also help situate them within spe-
cific sectors. Hence, the religious language that is prevalent in Ian Paisley's rheto-
ric throughout his entire career will be analysed as part of a sector analysis, rather 
than as religious speech per se. 
3.3.2. Methods of Context Analysis
The above outlined method will be used to investigate whether a securitising 
move is taking place within the speeches. In order to analyse whether the securi-
tising move is successful, the reaction of the audience must be studied, thus mov-
ing beyond semantically constituted discourse into social practice. The definition 
of audience will depend on the speech in question, but it  is befitting to surmise 
that the majority  of the speeches were given with supporters of DUP in mind, re-
gardless of whether they attended the annual conferences. Media reporting would 
also have made them widely accessible. Therefore, public support for the DUP 
conceptualised as results in referendums and elections will serve as a basis for de-
termining the success of securitising moves. Often, the success of a securitising 
move cannot be determined before a period of time has passed93. It seems highly 
likely that this particular case will also adhere to that assumption. 
As previously mentioned, the act of desecuritisation does not necessarily  occur 
through speech acts. On grounds of said performativity, desecuritisation is a part 
of the social, rather than discursive practice. I will identify these performative ac-
tions through an analysis of the social practice of the time; specifically operation-
alised as the status of the Peace Process, constitution of Northern Irish parliament 
and levels of violence. The number of deaths will be used as an indicator of the 
level of violence, using the extensive and detailed Sutton Index of Deaths94 avail-
able at the CAIN website.
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4. Analysis
This chapter will present my analysis of Paisley’s securitising moves, institution-
alised securitisations and desecuritisations. These have been identified through an 
analysis of Paisley's speeches in combination with a reading of secondary litera-
ture in order to understand the facilitating condition of context, which is espe-
cially crucial in regard to institutionalised securitisation and desecuritisation.
As discussed earlier, the concept of audience and audience accept is crucial to 
successful securitisation since it results in the legitimisation of extraordinary 
measures. Consequently, the audience of the speeches must  be defined. The ma-
jority of the speeches were made at DUP Annual Conferences whilst the remain-
der were made at Independent Orange Marches or released as public statements. I 
define the initial audience as those being present when the speech was made; DUP 
delegates or members of Independent Orange Orders. Since the speeches were 
also made in public settings with media reporting, I understand the broader audi-
ence to be anyone sympathetic to the views of Paisley, in particular the DUP elec-
torate. Albeit Paisley does claim to speak for “traditional unionism”95, one should 
note that his speech acts are performed whilst in the role as founder and leader of 
the DUP, a party which does not represent all unionists. Therefore, I define the 
potential DUP electorate as the intended audience of Paisley’s speeches. By defin-
ing the electorate as the main audience, Paisley's successful elections from 2003 
and onward can function as a conceptualisation of audience accept, which, as will 
be further discussed, could enable his attempted securitising moves to become 
successful securitisations. 
4.1. Securitising Ulster Unionism
This part of this analysis will focus on the securitising moves made by Ian Paisley 
in the analysed speeches. There are three main securitising moves apparent here. 
The first refers to the threat against  Ulster as a sovereign political entity, the sec-
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ond, the imagined community of Ulster unionists, and the third, the Protestant  
religion. I will subsequently discuss the intermingling of these three securitising 
moves and how this relates to the theoretical sector division as well as enabling a 
fuller understanding of the case. 
4.1.1. Threats to Ulster & the Union
Of all the threats articulated by Paisley, the threat towards Ulster as a sovereign 
political entity in a union with the UK stands out as being the most consistent and 
frequently called upon. I identify this securitising move as taking place within the 
political sector given that the threat is not military  in nature but instead political96. 
It can be briefly summarised as a fear that Ulster as part of the union is at  risk be-
cause the Irish Government either lays claim to, or is given, a level of influence 
upon matters in the North. The British connection is articulated as “an essential 
safeguard for the practice of religion and the freedom to pursue [our] way  of 
life”97. Thus, the existence of Ulster as part of a union becomes of vital impor-
tance to the Ulster people, who can only retain these liberties if Ulster and the un-
ion survive. 
Despite this threat being constantly articulated throughout the period of analy-
sis, the nature of how the threat is exerted differs over the fourteen years of speech 
acts. The shifting nature of the articulated threat runs parallel to the social practice 
in which the articulation is situated. Before the signing of the Belfast Agreement 
in 1998, the existential threat towards Ulster is perpetrated through the Joint Dec-
laration98. Whilst the British government had already  in 1990 claimed “no selfish 
strategic economic interest in Northern Ireland”99, the Joint Declaration issued in 
December 1993 affirmed that the people of Ireland had the right to self-
determination, that the situation in Northern Ireland should be solved between 
North and South with mutual consent, and that Northern Ireland's affiliation 
should be determined by  the people of Northern Ireland. In addition, paramilitar-
ily  linked groups would be permitted to participate in peace talks on the condition 
that they abandoned violence100. The declaration did, however, incite fears among 
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unionists that the union would be weakened, resulting in a united Ireland101. Given 
this background, Paisley  articulates Ulster as threatened by  the Republic of Ire-
land and Irish dominance102, as well as the British Government and its Prime Min-
ister103 since the document aims to “bring about the sole and sovereign authority 
of a Dublin Government over us”104.
The threat against the union is articulated somewhat differently after the sign-
ing of the Belfast Agreement, which is mainly concerned with civil and cultural 
rights, justice and policing and the decommissioning of weapons by paramilitar-
ies. It also serves as a basis for Northern Ireland's current constitutional stature as 
a part of the UK, introducing the devolved system of government105. It was signed 
by both the governments of the UK and Republic of Ireland and eight Northern 
Irish political parties106. The DUP was the only major party  in Northern Ireland to 
oppose the Agreement, which also resulted in a constitutional change in the Re-
public of Ireland where Articles 2 and 3, which laid claim to the six Northern Irish 
counties, were amended107.
In continuation of this, Paisley’s patterns of articulating threats evolve. Though 
they  are still mentioned, the main enemies are no longer the governments of the 
UK and Republic of Ireland. Instead, it is the then largest political party  in North-
ern Ireland, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and its leader, David Trimble who 
have “destroyed Ulster's foundation” by  signing the Belfast Agreement108. This 
rhetoric does not abate with time. In 1999, at a referendum at the Ulster Unionist 
Council (UUC)109  on endorsing Trimble’s leadership, Paisley states that “every 
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hand that is raised for Trimble today and for his prophecy is a hand just as much 
the enemy of Ulster as a hand of the IRA”110. In later years, the Belfast Agreement 
and its advocates are articulated as a threat to democracy111, whereas David Trim-
ble and the UUP are traitors112. Thus, it is clear that the biggest threat to the politi-
cal sovereignty  of Ulster post-Belfast Agreement comes from unionists who do 
not stay true to their ideals113.
4.1.2. Threats to the Ordinary Ulsterman
The second referent object that is articulated by Paisley  is that of the imagined 
community  of ordinary Ulstermen114. By speaking of the “unionist family”115, and 
“traditional Ulster principles” 116, the people of Ulster are presented as possessing 
a shared identity through norms, culture, and history  that encompasses both their 
unionism and Protestantism117. The survival of the Ulster unionist  collective iden-
tity is at stake, and consequently the threat is placed within the societal sector118. 
Like the threat against the union, the threat to Ulster identity is also exerted 
through the political context. Thus, the Joint Declaration and the Belfast  Agree-
ment's consequences of Dublin influence over Northern Irish politics is regarded 
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as embarking on a road to the inevitable end of partition119. This will result  in the 
dissolving of Ulster identity through vertical competition, where integration with 
an Irish nationalist  identity could dilute its uniqueness120. This perceived threat 
draws upon experiences in the post-partition Republic, when the unionists remain-
ing in the South rapidly internalised an Irish identity, thus resulting in a decline of 
the previously distinct British/Irish identity  in the Republic of Ireland121. There is 
also a fear that “unionists [will] always [be] in a minority  in matters relating to 
Northern Ireland”122 and that “Gaelic civilisation, a civilisation viewed by  Ulster 
and the rest of the United Kingdom as backward and negative” will be restored at 
the expense of the “Protestant North”123.
According to Paisley, this societal threat has already been seen in the removal 
of Orangemen's civil liberties by  forbidding them to march along traditional 
routes through predominantly nationalist/Catholic areas124. Identity is likewise 
threatened when vital symbols such as “the national flag is insulted” and “the 
Queen is reduced to the same level as the President of the Irish Republic”125.
These fears do, however, have historical connotations. The post-partition de-
cline of British and Protestant identities in the Republic of Ireland can be inter-
preted as a warning example of what could be in store for Ulster unionists if Ire-
land is united, and thus serves as a historical facilitating condition in Paisley's se-
curitising move. Additionally, the tradition of marching is a highly symbolic act 
that is of great importance to the demonstration of Protestant unionism in North-
ern Ireland. A threat to this right is therefore also a threat to the ability to retain a 
national identity. It is interesting to note that it  is in the articulation of threat to-
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ward identity, and marching in particular, that Paisley for the only time justifies 
violence as an extraordinary measure. He refers to rioting that took place in 
Drumcree after the RUC attempted to reroute an Orange Parade as how the “re-
cent bursting into flame in Drumcree should be a warning to the Government and 
those who hound them on to neuter the Union that the last word will not be spo-
ken by the Whitehall Government but by  the men and women of Ulster them-
selves”126.
4.1.3. Threats against Protestantism
The third articulated referent object is that of the Protestant faith. Due to the in-
termingling of religion and nationalism in Paisley's rhetoric, it can be difficult to 
distinguish from threats against collective identity, since a faith community also 
represents an identity. In this case however, I argue that Paisley's role as Presbyte-
rian minister, as well as his history within the evangelical movement, separates 
these notions of identity. Thus, I define the articulated threat where Protestantism 
is mentioned to take place within a religious sector. This securitising move is 
more or less constant during the period of analysis but does become less apparent 
in later years, when the DUP have won elections and agreed to power-sharing 
with Sinn Féin. 
Protestantism as a truth-bearing faith is presented as threatened by  the Roman 
Catholic Church127. The threat that the Roman Catholic Church exerts as a spiri-
tual entity  also entails a physical threat against the practitioners of ‘true Christian-
ity’. Referring to the large decline in the Protestant population in the Republic of 
Ireland post-partition, Paisley  articulates how “they have seen 80% of the Protes-
tant population eliminated in the Irish Republic and they are well aware the same 
fate awaits them if they allow themselves to be cajoled into a country which re-
fused to enter the 20th century even although that century is about to end”128. His-
torical discourses of violence and warfare are drawn upon by referring to the “tor-
ture of our Protestant forefathers for no other crime than that they  were Protes-
tants and would not bow the knee to the Papal Antichrist at the Vatican”129. The 
articulation of the Pope as Antichrist is notable here, since it specifically pinpoints 
the Catholic faith as being fallacious, thereby preventing eternal salvation for 
those who might otherwise have achieved it. 
32
126 Paisley, 1995
127 Paisley, 1994; Paisley, 1997; Paisley, 2004a
128 Paisley, 1993
129 Paisley, 1994
Consequently, the threat against Protestantism could be understood as twofold. 
Firstly, faith in itself, and thereby the chance of salvation, is under threat. Sec-
ondly, the community of Protestants is threatened by the monolith of Catholi-
cism130. One should, nevertheless, note that only a minority  of Northern Ireland's 
identifying Protestants adhere to Paisley’s interpretation of faith and scripture131. 
Also, when Paisley refers to true Christianity, he is referring to the evangelical, 
born-again Christian movement that he represents, in particular the fundamentalist 
Free Presbyterian Church132.  
As will be discussed later, Paisley's articulation of faith as a referent object is 
intricately  tied to the concepts of the political nature of Ulster and the unionist 
identity. Yet, religion does play  an important role in how these articulations are 
made, in that his speeches frequently draw upon biblical quotations, referring to 
the truth of the scripture133, and the “Almighty God of justice”134. In addition, his 
symbolic power as both a political and religious leader serves as a facilitating 
condition. I thereby assert that religion cannot be delimited solely  to an expression 
of social identity. 
4.1.4. Synthesising Sectors
Whilst the sector division demonstrated above is useful as an analytical tool, sec-
tors are not closed systems, and ought therefore not to be regarded as separate135. 
This is extremely relevant to this analysis where the political entity of Ulster, the 
social identity of unionists and the Protestant faith are intermingled in such a way 
that they cannot be separated if one is to achieve a deeper understanding of Pais-
ley’s securitising moves. The articulated threats and enemies do not differ re-
markably between sectors. Hence, the Roman Catholic Church poses a threat both 
to the Protestant faith and the Protestant unionist identity as well as the survival of 
Ulster136, the Irish constitution is a threat both to the union and the unionist identi-
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ty137 and the Belfast Agreement is a threat to Protestantism, the union, and Ulster 
traditions and culture138. 
I understand this intermingling of referent objects as an expression of what 
Brewer and Higgins refer to as anti-Catholicism139. The term encompasses three 
different typologies: the secular, based on a defence of the union whilst attacking 
the political ideology of republicanism; the theological where Catholicism is 
Christianity  in error; and finally the covenantal, where Ulster is regarded as the 
land promised to Protestants by God, who has also endorsed its constitutional un-
ion with Britain140. It thus becomes a divine mission for Protestants to save Ulster 
from the Catholic Church141. One could consequently argue that Paisley, as the 
Troubles started, became convinced that he had been “commissioned by God to 
defend Irish Protestantism - that he was, in effect, God’s man in Ulster”142. 
In the covenantal mode of anti-Catholicism, identity, politics and religion can-
not be separated. This also means that  one referent object cannot exist  without the 
other. When Paisley refers to the “right-thinking people of Northern Ireland”143, 
he equates them with the “Ulster unionists”144 and their “Protestant birthright”145. 
Ulster only gains sovereignty  through its union with Britain, unionist identity  can 
only exist if Ulster prevails, and the Protestant faith requires the union in order not 
to dissolve. Yet, despite existential threats, the religious aspect helps assert that 
Ulster will prevail, if it is God’s will146. Thus, even if “Ulster Protestants have 
been slandered throughout the world, [...] they have kept on their way resolved to 
do and die for the cause of God and Ulster”147.
On the background of this synthesis, I will regard the analysed securitising 
moves as one single securitisation that takes place within the political, societal 
and religious sectors. The lack of articulated emergency measures does make it 
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somewhat problematic to define Paisley's securitisations as successful. The theo-
retical implications of this will be discussed in detail further on, but for now I will 
define Paisley's attempts at securitising Ulster unionism as successful, due to both 
the use of security speak, clearly articulated referent objects and threats and audi-
ence accept through successful elections in the 2000s. 
4.2. The Securitisation of Sectarian Violence
The securitising move that refers to the safety of the Northern Irish population, 
and therethrough also to the physical survival of the state, is located within the 
military sector. It is important to note that the acts of violence referred to here are 
not necessarily  objective threats. Rather, they are perceived through “historical 
and material facilitating conditions [that] affect the processes of securitization and 
desecuritization in a fairly  systematic way”148. According to Paisley, the existen-
tial threat of violence toward the referent object of the state of Ulster is perpe-
trated by  the IRA and their political counterpart, Sinn Féin. The securitising move 
occurs frequently throughout the period of analysis, but  is especially prevalent in 
the early 2000s, when the discussion regarding IRA decommissioning is at its 
peak. While the overarching referent object in this securitising move is the state of 
Ulster, Paisley  also articulates the people of Northern Ireland149, the “security  of 
the Province”150, “free citizens of Britannia”151 and even “the right to live”152 as 
referent objects threatened by “the dark pit of bloodthirsty republican terror-
ism”153.  
Depending on the context, the articulated threat entails different consequences. 
During the Peace Process in the 1990s, the IRA and Sinn Féin pose a threat 
through their inclusion in the negotiations, which is seen as a compromise with 
terrorists154. The negotiations thus send a message that “bullets are more influen-
tial than votes”155. Subsequently, the acceptance of IRA in political circles be-
comes a threat to the stability, peace, and existence of Ulster. IRA violence con-
tinues to be a threat however, amongst other reasons because the Belfast Agree-
ment includes a section regarding prisoner release where “the worst murdering 
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scoundrels ever put behind bars are being set free”156. This statement might  indeed 
also refer to the loyalist  counterparts of republican terrorists, and can hence be 
interpreted as an articulation of sectarian violence per se posing a threat, and not 
solely violence perpetrated by republicans157.
In 2001, the IRA agreed to decommission its weapons following conditions of 
the Belfast Agreement. The process was completed in September 2005. In 2000, 
Paisley  articulates “illegal armies and equipment”158, coupled with a weak and 
demoralised police force159 as a threat to Ulster. He subsequently  refers to how the 
“IRA/Sinn Féin murder squads and other terrorists hold on to their weapons”160. 
IRA criminality and violence continue to be articulated as a threat161. Decommis-
sioning is questioned and articulated as a “blatant lie” that has been pushed “down 
the throats of the Ulster people”162. By drawing upon a collective understanding 
of the violent IRA threat, Paisley  aims to convince his audience that the IRA have 
not decommissioned and therefore still exert a threat against the people of Ulster, 
both through the violence and criminality as well as the political influence that 
they might gain access to.
This reliance on a collective understanding of the threat posed by  an enemy can 
be understood as an institutionalised securitisation. Consequently, calling the IRA 
‘terrorists’ automatically connects them to the bombings and shootings that they 
have perpetrated, both against the British army and against civilians in Northern 
Ireland and Britain163, and thus, few more words are needed in order to articulate 
the organisation as a threat. Therefore, whilst the IRA and Sinn Féin may often be 
spoken of in the same sentence as “blackmail, murder or terrorism”164, they are 
also articulated as a threat several times in Paisley's speeches, where further ex-
planation of how and why they exert this threat is not elaborated upon165.
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Based on this idea of institutionalised securitisation, I conclude republican 
violence to have been successfully securitised by Ian Paisley, since no further 
elaboration is needed on his part to invoke audience accept for his securitising 
move, as demonstrated through the DUP’s electoral success. On the background 
of this and the mentioned facilitating conditions, the issue can then be moved into 
the sphere of security. 
4.3. Desecuritisation
The concept of desecuritisation is integral to this study, given how the conflict in 
Northern Ireland has changed significantly in the past decade. In general, the re-
moval of an issue from the security  sphere to a communicative sphere of normal 
politics through desecuritisation is regarded as normatively positive, as well as 
being better for democracy166. This section aims to analyse which desecuritisa-
tions have brought about the relatively  stable current situation in Northern Ireland 
- if any - and how these relate to Paisley's securitisations, using the typology  of 
change through stabilisation, replacement, rearticulation and silencing developed 
by Hansen167.      
4.3.1. Executive Power-Sharing
The reintroduction of devolved government in Northern Ireland, through the 
Northern Ireland Assembly, was one of the main features of the Belfast Agree-
ment. In practice, it entails that Northern Ireland has an independent legislative 
body, devolved from the British parliament in Westminster. The Assembly is 
based on power-sharing between ethnic groups, where both nationalists and un-
ionists are in practice guaranteed places in both the parliamentary body of the As-
sembly  and the governing body of the Executive Committee. This means that  ma-
jor parties cannot be excluded from legislature, which, considering the cleavage 
between nationalists and unionists apparent today, guarantees representation for 
both sides168. 
When Paisley  in 1998 spoke of Sinn Féin’s Martin McGuinness as coming 
from the “filthy nest of murderous Irish nationalism”169, few could have fathomed 
that they would be governing together barely a decade later. Considering the 
rhetoric used to articulate the Peace Process as a threat to unionism and Protes-
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tants, it  is remarkable that the successful power-sharing Executive Committee 
could come about in this relatively  short period of time. Regardless of his rhetoric, 
Paisley  performed a desecuritising act by accepting both his own and McGuin-
ness' new positions as representatives of the largest parties in Northern Ireland 
after the elections in 2007. Seen from the perspective of his constituency, this 
change of heart could be viewed with suspicion. Yet, as Ganiel asserts, Paisley 
could justify  the DUP's participation in the structures set up by the Belfast 
Agreement by  referring to how he never did support it, but instead called for a re-
negotiation, something that succeeded somewhat with the St. Andrew's Agree-
ment170.
In 2007, Paisley asserts that he no longer deems the union to be threatened. He 
speaks of how republicans have ended their terror campaign and accepted parti-
tion and simultaneously  claims that the union with Britain has been strength-
ened171. This mode of desecuritisation can be identified as a change through stabi-
lisation, wherein the conflicting parties have ended up recognising each other as 
legitimate172. This might not mean that the conflict has been resolved, but instead 
that the issue has been moved to the background. However, since neither party of 
the conflict has fully won, there is still a risk that the conflict could flare up again. 
One could also call it  a demonstration of rearticulation; an active political so-
lution has been offered and the securitisation has been resolved173. As such, a 
power-sharing Executive Committee may indeed be a demonstration of decreased 
animosity, in that is has moved security issues into the political sphere to be han-
dled by democratic means. Yet, a question does remain as to whether a conflict 
can ever truly be resolved. Though there is some evidence that changes in identity 
are indeed taking place, in particular in regard to strength of religious affilia-
tion174, the cleavages within Northern Irish society  are still apparent, regardless of 
the current political structure. There is no guarantee that a political solution such 
as this will result in a desecuritisation of the religious or societal aspect of the se-
curitisation. The identity of unionists is still intricately  tied to the British symbols 
of banal nationalism that are used to construct  and reproduce imagined communi-
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ties in order to create ties to geopolitical entities175. This was demonstrated when a 
decision by  the Belfast City Council to fly  the Union Jack 18 days a year instead 
of every  day sparked nationwide riots in the summer of 2012. The sectarian vio-
lence continued well into 2013 and is still somewhat ongoing. Thus, despite a per-
ceived political solution to the conflict, the animosity and tensions between the 
unionist and nationalist communities remain unresolved and consequently, the 
desecuritisation that  power-sharing entails may refer mostly, if not exclusively, to 
the political entity  of Ulster, therethrough separating the sector synthesis. Despite 
threats to identity and religion being closely  intertwined with the idea of the state 
of Ulster, they  are also dependent on ideas of othering that are not necessarily  al-
tered through performative political action.
I do, however, assert that a desecuritisation through rearticulation has taken 
place in regard to the securitisation of the political entity of Ulster, through the 
establishment of power-sharing. I also claim that while a minor desecuritisation 
has taken place in regard to the imagined community  of Ulster, the issue has not 
been resolved, and could thus be defined as change through stabilisation given 
that the tensions are mostly  dormant, but seem viable to flare up  when threats re-
lating to cultural identity and heritage are perceived. On a theoretical level, there 
may also be an ontological contradiction in claiming the finality that a rearticula-
tion entails, since finality  is inherently impossible given how dichotomies cannot 
cease to exist altogether176. Yet, the process of politicisation does not necessarily 
require a dichotomy to cease altogether. The issue of how to govern the Province 
is political in nature, and the division of communities as well as the relationship to 
the Republic of Ireland and the British Government are an inherent part of the 
communicative political sphere. For these issues to be depoliticised they would 
need to be silenced completely, and given the nature and history of the situation in 
Northern Ireland, this seems extremely unlikely. 
4.3.2. De-escalation of Sectarian Violence
Another performance of desecuritisation can be connected to the institutionalised 
securitisation of sectarian violence. In this regard, several performative actions 
within social practice have taken place. The issue of performance is especially 
important here, since it is inherent to the nature of desecuritisation that  it  is not 
necessarily performed and reproduced in speech. However, it is important to keep 
in mind that institutionalised securitisations are notoriously difficult to desecuri-
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tise177. In continuation of this, a question can certainly be raised as to whether 
violence in itself can ever be desecuritised, or whether the institutionalisation is so 
hegemonic that little convincing will ever be necessary  on the part of the securitis-
ing actor in order to articulate it as a threat.
Yet, several performative actions have occurred since the Belfast Agreement 
was implemented and violence has de-escalated significantly, as has militarisa-
tion178. Firstly, the estimated number of deaths related to sectarian violence has 
decreased considerably. In 1998, the total number of deaths was 55, whereas in 
2012, two victims were recorded. During the past decade, sectarian deaths have 
been at less than 10 victims per year, and are often associated with dissident re-
publican groups. Many  of the murders have been committed by the same organi-
sation that the victim was a member of, and drugs are suspected to be related to a 
number of the cases179.  Secondly, both the IRA and loyalist  paramilitaries have 
decommissioned their weapons. As previously discussed, the 2005 decommission-
ing of weapons by the IRA was regarded with suspicion from Paisley, yet it was 
generally  accepted by the Irish and British governments as well as the Inde-
pendent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD), the independent 
organisation monitoring the decommissioning, that the weapons were destroy-
ed180. Lastly, Operation Banner came to an end in 2007. The operation was the 
longest-running British military operation in history: the first British troops were 
deployed to protect Catholic civilians at the beginning of the Troubles in 1969. 
The withdrawal of troops was welcomed by nationalists, whilst the UUP and DUP 
regarded it  as premature; Paisley articulating security normalisation as a surrender 
to the IRA that every unionist should condemn181. 
While these indicators do point to a de-escalation of violence and demilitarisa-
tion of Northern Ireland they do not, however, prove that sectarian violence in 
general and republican violence in particular has necessarily been completely 
desecuritised. There are, however, indicators that it may be both articulated as, 
and perceived as less of a threat182. Yet, violence, criminality  and terrorism con-
tinue to be mentioned in conjunction with Sinn Féin and the IRA both during and 
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after decommissioning183 . This pulls the normative aspect of desecuritisation into 
question and affirms that one cannot claim that securitisation is universally bad 
and desecuritisation is universally  good given that “no ‘universalism’ can exist 
without spatial or temporal exceptions”184. Hence, a desecuritisation of sectarian 
violence, be it republican or loyalist, may  indeed not be normatively desirable 
since this could result in it being regarded as legitimate political action. By re-
maining institutionally securitised, sectarian violence can be accepted as a threat 
to the people of Northern Ireland and can consequently be dealt with accordingly.
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5. Discussion
This chapter involves a discussion of the results of my analysis. Firstly, I discuss 
Paisley's securitising moves and whether these can be regarded as successful, 
given the lack of articulated emergency measures. Secondly, the concept of other-
ing is elaborated upon, along with how friend/enemy distinctions constitute an 
understanding of both security and the political within the Copenhagen School. I 
discuss this in relation to how Paisley articulates the Other as a threat, thus consti-
tuting an identity  for himself and his supporters, and how a reconstruction of the 
Other could contribute to peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
5.1. Defining Successful Securitisation
According to the Copenhagen School, a securitisation needs to fulfil a number of 
criteria in order to be successful. An existential threat toward the referent object 
must be articulated in conjunction with a justification for extraordinary measures 
that are not ordinarily accessible. The audience subsequently needs to accept the 
use of extraordinary measures185. The exact moment of when a successful secu-
ritisation occurs can be difficult to pinpoint, since extraordinary measures do not 
need to be implemented in order for a securitisation to be successful. Also, this 
narrow definition of success ignores how institutionalised securitisations can 
come about over time, without a specific moment of intervention186. 
Since audience accept for emergency measures is, nevertheless, deemed crucial 
for successful securitisation, it must be defined. In this study, the audience for 
Paisley's speech acts has been defined as his electorate. Therefore, I assert that 
audience accept for any articulated emergency measures is displayed through the 
democratic practices of election, or supporting his standpoint in a referendum. The 
referendum on the Belfast Agreement took place in 1999, and led to the ratifica-
tion of the agreement by the populations of the Republic of Ireland and Northern 
Ireland. Despite overall support for the agreement187, only 57% of Northern Irish 
Protestants voted in favour compared to 99% of Catholics188. It is beyond the 
scope of this thesis to attempt to prove that the lack of support in the Protestant 
community  was due to Paisley's securitising moves during and after the Peace 
Process. One can, however, not deny that the DUP was the only  political party in 
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Northern Ireland which did not support the Agreement. The first post-Agreement 
election took place in June 1998 and resulted in a small decrease for the DUP. It 
was therefore not  before the DUP victory in 2003 that Paisley could demonstrate 
what he had claimed to be doing all along: that he represented the majority of Ul-
ster189. Considering how he had continued to criticise the Belfast Agreement in the 
years following its signing, this vote of confidence must be considered an ac-
knowledgement that points to a certain level of success for Paisley in establishing 
his securitising moves as crucial to the survival of Ulster. 
On this background, it is particularly  noteworthy how there is a lack of articu-
lated emergency measures in Paisley's speeches. Only once, in regard to the 
Drumcree riots in 1995, does he justify the use of violence. While he does refer to 
how Ulster unionists must “come together to defend their hard-won rights and lib-
erties”190, how Ulster will not surrender191 and evokes images of war and fight-
ing192 , Paisley neither instigates nor justifies the use of violence193. On the con-
trary, he speaks of democracy and the ballot box, and the “freely expressed demo-
cratic will of the people of the Province”194. Thus, an element that the Copenha-
gen School defines as crucial to securitisation is not apparent here, which raises 
the issue of whether securitisation has truly been successful and if so, how to de-
fine emergency measures. 
One way of stretching the theory could be to understand the election of Paisley 
in 2003 (and 2007) as an emergency measure in itself. In 2001, he does claim that 
Ulster's only hope of survival lies in supporting him, a statement that could be 
conceived as somewhat hyperbolic. Yet, albeit the success of a candidate that 
would previously have been seen as impossible giving his antagonistic nature 
might seem extraordinary, it  still takes place within the open, political sphere. The 
extraordinary  measures of securitisation are called such because they do not take 
place within this communicative sphere. They are exceptions that might not oth-
erwise be legitimised within a democratic forum. That is not to say, however, that 
there is not something paradoxical in the way Paisley calls for open and demo-
cratic elections and articulates himself as a democrat195, yet simultaneously  re-
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fuses to acknowledge votes for Trimble196 or Sinn Féin197 as legitimate; but even 
this does not necessarily make Paisley’s election success extraordinary. 
It could also be tempting to define Paisley's securitising moves as successful 
politicisations, where the issues are established firmly  on the political agenda. Yet, 
in his speech acts there is no doubt that he does articulate threats and speak secu-
rity, whilst gaining accord politically. Thus, the dichotomy between security and 
politics, and lack of graduation therein, poses a problem in regard to where the 
line between politics and security is drawn198. Based on stringent Copenhagen 
School theory, the securitisations have not been successful due to the lack of ar-
ticulated extraordinary  measures, yet, they are certainly articulations of security 
speak. Paisley draws upon substantial religious and historic discourses in order to 
further emphasise the threat that is posed to Ulster. Yet, if the theory is widened in 
order to allow for the declining importance of extraordinary measures, the purpose 
of the theory is also put into question since it  aims to understand how the securiti-
sation of an issue makes it possible to fulfil and legitimise extraordinary measures 
outside the democratic sphere. Despite this, I do assert that an increased focus on 
facilitating conditions and context as an integral part  of successful securitisation 
could improve its applicability  to cases where other elements of successful secu-
ritisation are not evident.
5.2. Rearticulating Identities: Prospects for Peace
An important  theoretical concept  that serves as a basis for the reasoning within 
Paisley’s securitisations, it that of the Other. The concept of othering has been ex-
plored extensively by known scholars such as Edward Said199, Michel Foucault200, 
Judith Butler201 and Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe202, and outlines how the 
identity  of the self is constructed in relation to a constitutive Other. Through his 
speeches, Paisley constructs a threatening enemy Other, whether it be David 
Trimble, the Irish Government, Sinn Féin or the Pope, who is in a dichotomous 
relationship  with the righteous and truth-bearing community that he represents. 
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This animosity provides the justification for the articulated threats and, when ap-
plicable, the legitimisation of emergency measures. 
A focus on the friend/enemy distinction constitutes part of the Copenhagen 
School's understanding of politics and security. The unavoidability of such a di-
chotomy implies a return to a logic of politics as derived by Carl Schmitt, where 
this distinction encompasses the very notion of what politics is. That is not to say 
that the Copenhagen School solely understands politics as Schmittian; its under-
standing of the political as a communicative sphere of deliberation is decidedly 
inspired by Hannah Arendt203. Despite this, by drawing upon the above-mentioned 
postmodern scholars, one can surmise that the dichotomy of othering may indeed 
be unavoidable, considering that the very construction of identity is dependent on 
an Other.
As my analysis has highlighted, successful securitisation is dependent on the 
articulation of a threat and enemy in relation to a referent object: the dichotomy 
between the threatening and the threatened. Whilst the process of desecuritisation 
does seem to result in a change in how this dichotomy is understood and acted 
upon, it does not necessarily  entail its cessation. As Behnke has argued in con-
tinuation of Schmitt, political communities can only  exist through distinguishing 
themselves from the enemy 204. As such, the desecuritising ideal type of rearticula-
tion, wherein a securitisation is completely resolved, may present a logical para-
dox, given the inherence of dichotomous enmity to politics. Therefore, a replace-
ment due to a process of change in identities, or change through stabilisation may 
present a more accurate description of desecuritisations in the case of Northern 
Ireland. Despite these claims, I do nonetheless assert  that desecuritisation through 
rearticulation could be a theoretical possibility. The friend/enemy distinction that 
is inherent to politics could certainly be understood as othering which, while ad-
hering to Behnke’s unavoidable dichotomous relationship, does not necessarily 
demand that the relationship to be one of hostile animosity. As such, there is no 
innate contradiction in combining the self/other dichotomy with the understanding 
of politics as communicative. I would claim that this has been demonstrated 
through the processes of securitisation and desecuritisation articulated and per-
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formed by Ian Paisley. The change in rhetoric205 demonstrates a change in the will 
to work toward a compromise, in contrast to the previous hard line stance. 
The ideal type of replacement does, nevertheless, deserve further elaboration. 
By accepting the poststructural premise that othering is unavoidable, it becomes 
necessary  to look for other securitisations. In the case of Northern Ireland, the past 
could function as one such Other. Thus, by articulating past animosities and vio-
lent conflict as a security threat  to the referent object of the current stable situa-
tion, a general consensus in regard to avoiding repeating patterns of the past could 
be achieved206. Another, more orthodox, way of replacement would be through the 
replacement of one type of threat or enemy with another. Here, the role of religion 
could play an important part. Both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland 
are notably  religious compared to the majority of Europe, whereas Britain is one 
of the most secular countries of the continent207. Therefore, an ecumenical com-
mon defence of faith could provide a high level of identity reconstruction, as the 
religions shift from opposition to juxtaposition208. A final, and perhaps most vi-
able replacement, could be an othering reconstruction of ‘violent extremists’ as 
opposed to ‘common, peaceful Northern Irish citizens’ - regardless of religious 
affiliation. Indeed, the construction of such a dichotomy is even somewhat at-
tempted by Paisley in his condemnation of sectarian violence209.
The ontological and normative understanding of politics and security in the 
Copenhagen School is essential to how processes of desecuritisation can be un-
derstood. As such, one important issue to discuss when speaking of desecuritisa-
tion is the normative implications of desecuritising an issue, and whether a move 
from a securitised to depoliticised sphere could ever be beneficial. A depoliticised 
issue is moved out  of the communicative sphere of politics, and is, as such, not 
recognised as an issue worthy of the political agenda. In general, the Copenhagen 
School prefers politicisation to non-politicisation, since it  allows an issue to be 
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present on the political agenda210. However, there are possible exceptions to this. 
A deeply securitised issue might, in fact, be better off being depoliticised to avoid 
being resecuritised211.
Recent flare-ups of sectarian violence in Northern Ireland have proven that  col-
lective identity, in particular, still runs inherent risks of being securitised. Consid-
ering the ethno-religious connotations of this conflict, I therefore assert  that a 
complete depoliticisation of religion and national identity where these affiliations 
become subordinate to other basic political issues such as economy, education and 
foreign policy, might be advantageous in creating new, less infected, cleavages in 
Northern Irish society. It therefore seems plausible that such an act of depoliticisa-
tion in itself may involve a change in identity and the self/other animosity inter-
est212. On a theoretical level, this involves understanding Schmitt’s friend/enemy 
distinction as a process of othering, thus enabling rearticulation, and thereby al-
lowing a stable and lasting peace in Northern Ireland to become a possibility. By 
actively rearticulating the Other in a less antagonistic fashion, actors such as Pais-
ley  could exert an important influence and create a prospect for changes in iden-
tity which could eventually lead to a complete rearticulation of all hostile ele-
ments that facilitate the Northern Irish conflict and consequently result in lasting 
peace.
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6. Conclusion
The aim of this thesis has been to shed light on the conflict in Northern Ireland: an 
undeniable part of a shared European history that is known because of its vio-
lence, but where the underlying reasons are not generally  discussed outside the 
British Isles. Through an application of CDA through the Copenhagen School of 
Security Studies to speeches by  Ian Paisley, I sought to investigate processes of 
securitisation and desecuritisation and their connection to changes in the Northern 
Irish conflict. Two discourses of securitisation were unearthed through my analy-
sis: one relating to the referent object of the unionist Ulster, and the other relating 
to sectarian violence. Further, I moved beyond the speech acts to explore the so-
cial practice wherein the processes were situated, and identified performances of 
desecuritisation that were evident through the introduction of power-sharing and a 
de-escalation of violence. Lastly, I discussed the theoretical implications of a lack 
of articulated extraordinary  measures for successful securitisation as defined by 
the Copenhagen School, and how the concept of othering could be actively used 
in desecuritisation to facilitate peace and stability in Northern Ireland. 
In concluding this analysis and considering the prospect for a final solution to 
the conflict in Northern Ireland, the current personal role of Ian Paisley ought to 
be mentioned. He is now 87 years old and has stepped down both as leader of the 
DUP and Free Presbyterian Church. There is a new generation on the rise that did 
not experience the extreme violence of the 1970s and thus seem less likely  to re-
sort to ancient animosities. However, it is important to note that a generational 
shift alone will not solve the tensions between communities. Because of the length 
and death-toll of the conflict, few if any families have been left unaffected, and 
experiences do trickle down to new generations. On the other hand, religious af-
filiation is currently in decline in both the North and South, and consequently  the 
religious nationalism that is articulated by Paisley  and his followers also seems 
likely to decline somewhat. I surmise that if the religious content in religious na-
tionalism is taken out, a softer and less dogmatic form of nationalism is likely  to 
emerge. A similar conclusion could be drawn from the recent rise of a specific 
Northern Irish identification as separate from an Irish or British identification213, 
which also seems to imply a less conflicted future. 
Although this thesis has focused exclusively on the conflict in Northern Ire-
land, I believe there are several conclusions that  could be applied on a broader 
scale. Firstly, regardless of the background to a conflict, a lasting and stable solu-
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tion cannot be facilitated by the moderate actors of a conflict since they, per se, 
will not have the support of the more extreme parties. In order for a conflict to be 
desecuritised, the most extreme parties must therefore recognise each other as le-
gitimate, and perform these desecuritising acts in conjunction. Secondly, in to-
day’s globalised world, no conflict can be regarded as completely isolated. Events 
such as 9/11 changed the world security discourse and, arguably, facilitated the 
decommissioning of weapons in Northern Ireland 214. Therefore, on the theoretical 
level, the role of facilitating conditions within the Copenhagen School need to be 
regarded as inherent to securitisation. This would help broaden the approach, 
since security as a speech act is always spoken in a social context. Finally, regard-
less of wherein the points of issue in any conflict  lies, I claim that a reconstruction 
of identities could play  a pivotal role in the quest for peace and stability, in that 
the Other can be recognised, not as an enemy, but as a fellow, if different, human 
being. 
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Appendix 2: Glossary of Key Terms and Actors
Anglo-Irish Agreement: Agreement signed in 1985 by  British Prime Minister 
Margaret Thatcher and Irish Taoiseach Garret Fitzgerald. It aimed to bring about 
an end to the Troubles by confirming Northern Ireland’s constitutional role as a 
part of the UK but also, for the first time, giving the Irish government an advisory 
role in the governing of Northern Ireland. 
Anglo-Irish Treaty: 1921 treaty  between what was then the Government of the 
UK and Ireland and representatives of the Irish Republic. It concluded the War of 
Independence by giving the new Irish Free State Commonwealth Dominion 
status, but also allowed Northern Ireland to opt out of the Free State. 
Belfast Agreement: Also known as the Good Friday  Agreement, the agreement 
was signed between the British and Irish governments and all major political par-
ties in Northern Ireland, bar the DUP, on Good Friday  1998 and signified the first 
major step towards stabilisation. 
Bertie Ahern: Taoiseach in the Republic of Ireland from 1996 to 2011 and leader 
of Fianna Fáil. As such, played a pivotal role in the negotiations of the Belfast 
Agreement in 1998. 
David Trimble: Leader of the UUP from 1995 to 2005, he also served as First 
Minister of Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2002. Trimble held a key role in the 
negotiations leading up to the Belfast  Agreement, and was the joint recipient of 
the Nobel Peace Prize with John Hume in 1998. After the UUP was defeated by 
the DUP in the 2005 general elections to British parliament, Trimble stepped 
down as party leader, and subsequently joined the Conservative Party. 
Decommissioning: The act of disarming by reducing and destroying weaponry by 
the various paramilitary organisations in Northern Ireland. Decommissioning was 
a key part of the Belfast Agreement.
Democratic Ulster Party (DUP): The largest unionist party  in the Northern Ire-
land Assembly. The DUP is generally  regarded as a socially conservative right-
wing party. It  was founded by Ian Paisley  in 1971 and is currently led by Peter 
Robinson. The party has strong links to evangelicalism and Protestant churches, in 
particular the Free Presbyterian Church and adheres to the slogan “For God and 
Ulster.” The DUP was the only  major political party in Northern Ireland to oppose 
the Belfast Agreement in 1998.
First Minister: The First Minister and Deputy  First Minister are responsible for 
running the Northern Irish Office of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. 
The two ministers have equal power and are nominated by the largest parties in 
the Assembly. Current First Minister is Peter Robinson of the DUP, with Sinn 
Féin’s Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. 
Free Presbyterian Church of Ulster: A denomination founded by  Rev. Ian Pais-
ley  in 1951. The church is evangelical and adheres to fundamentalist and Calvinist 
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Protestant doctrines and has approximately 12 000 members, around 1% of the 
Northern Irish population. It  is especially known for its opposition to Roman Ca-
tholicism. Ian Paisley retired from religious ministry in 2012. 
Gerry Adams: Leader of Sinn Féin since 1983, he played an instrumental role in 
the facilitation of the Peace Process from the late 1980s and onwards. Despite al-
legations of ties to the IRA, Adams has denied ever being affiliated with the or-
ganisation. 
Independent Orange Institution: An offshoot of the Orange Order that  attempts 
to be somewhat less political than the traditional Orange Order, focusing on 
guarding the principles of Reformation Protestantism. The Independent Orange 
Institution is thus not politically affiliated, but Ian Paisley (who is not a member) 
has been a frequent speaker at rallies and marches. 
Irish Republican Army (IRA): The Irish Republican Army as referred to here is 
an abbreviation of the Provisional Irish Republican Army, which formed after a 
split with the Official IRA over differences of ideology in 1969. Identified as a 
terrorist organisation, the majority  of its victims during the Troubles were mem-
bers of the security forces, but a large number of civilians were also killed. The 
IRA decommissioned its weapons in 2005, but is still alleged to have ties to or-
ganised crime. The organisation is also claimed to have close ties to the political 
party Sinn Féin. 
John Hume: A founding member of the SDLP, he was the second leader between 
1979 and 2001. He is credited with being one of the architects of the Peace Proc-
ess and Belfast Agreement and received the Nobel Peace Prize together with 
David Trimble in 1998. 
Joint Declaration: Also known as the Downing Street Declaration, this declara-
tion was issued in December 1993 by British Prime Minister John Major and Irish 
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds. 
Martin McGuinness: Sinn Féin politician and Deputy First Minister of Northern 
Ireland since 2007. In the 1970s, McGuinness was involved in the Provisional 
IRA and held the position of second-in-command in Derry  at the time of Bloody 
Sunday in 1972. He left the organisation in 1974 and subsequently became promi-
nent within Sinn Féin. 
Northern Ireland Executive Committee: The administrative branch of the 
Northern Ireland General Assembly to which it answers. The Executive consists 
of the First  Minister and Deputy First Minister as well as various individual min-
isters.
Northern Ireland General Assembly: The devolved legislature of Northern Ire-
land, acting as a parliament, that has power of legislation in a wide range of areas 
that are not reserved for the Parliament of the UK. It also appoints the Northern 
Ireland Executive. The Assembly was established as a consequence of the Belfast 
Agreement and sits at Stormont in Belfast. 
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Operation Banner: The name of the British force’s armed campaign in Northern 
Ireland from 1969 to 2007. Initially, troops were deployed to aid the RUC in pro-
tecting Catholic civilians from loyalist violence. However, especially after the 
events of Bloody Sunday in 1972, where 14 civilian Catholic demonstrators were 
killed by British paratroopers, they lost legitimacy amongst the nationalist minor-
ity. Many IRA campaigns were mounted against their presence, and a total of 763 
members of the British armed forces were killed during the Troubles, whilst they 
allegedly killed 305 people, whereof 156 were civilians.
Orange Order: A fraternal organisation that is strongly  linked to unionism and 
requires that members be Protestant. The order has lodges in most Northern Irish 
towns. A large part of the activities of the organisation are parades of which sev-
eral are held annually, especially leading up  to the commemoration of the Battle 
of the Boyne on the 12th of July. Marches typically  move from the Orange Hall to 
the local church and have been seen as controversial expressions of sectarianism, 
in particular when traditional routes have passed through Catholic neighbour-
hoods. During the Troubles, Orange marches often resulted in rioting. 
Peter Robinson: First Minister of Northern Ireland and leader of the DUP since 
2008. Also one of the founding members of the DUP. 
Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC): The police force in Northern Ireland be-
tween 1922 and 2000. Due to its pro-unionist stance and almost exclusively Prot-
estant membership, the RUC was controversial, and not accepted as legitimate by 
Northern Irish nationalists during the Troubles. In 2001, it was replaced by the 
Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI).
Seamus Mallon: Deputy Leader of the SDLP from 1979 to 2001 and Deputy First 
Minister of Northern Ireland from 1998 to 2001. 
Sinn Féin: Meaning “We Ourselves” in Irish, is the largest nationalist party  in 
Northern Ireland. They are currently  the second-largest  party in the Northern Ire-
land Assembly and hold the position of Deputy First Minister. Sinn Féin has tradi-
tionally  held close ties with the IRA, being described as its political branch, and 
many of its top leaders have been accused of affiliation with the organisation. 
Social Democratic Labour Party (SDLP): A nationalist and social democratic 
party  in Northern Ireland. The party  supports a united Irish Republic and was the 
most popular nationalist party  in Northern Ireland during the Troubles. In contrast 
to Sinn Féin, they strongly rejected violence and held no ties to republican organi-
sations. The SDLP held the position of Deputy First Minister in the Executive un-
til 2001, however, after the Belfast Agreement and IRA ceasefire, they lost ground 
to Sinn Féin.
St. Andrew’s Agreement: Agreement signed in 2006 by British and Irish gov-
ernments as well as the main political parties. Its main components involve Sinn 
Féin acceptance of the newly instated Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI) 
and a DUP commitment to power-sharing between unionists and nationalists, re-
sulting in the restoration of the Northern Ireland Assembly and Executive. 
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Stormont: The Northern Irish parliament buildings in Belfast.
Taoiseach: The Prime Minister and Head of Government in the Republic of Ire-
land. As of 2011, the Irish Taoiseach is Enda Kenny.  
Ulster Unionist Council  (UUC): The Ulster Unionist Council is an umbrella or-
ganisation for Unionist political groups in Northern Ireland.
Ulster Unionist Party (UUP): The UUP is a unionist, conservative political party 
in Northern Ireland. It  was the largest unionist party in Northern Ireland through-
out the Troubles. Its leader, David Trimble, was pivotal to the Peace Process, 
which resulted in the Belfast Agreement. After the agreement, the party held the 
position of First Minister until 2001 but has since lost ground to the DUP which 
has taken over as the largest unionist party in the North. 
Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF): A loyalist  paramilitary  group in Northern Ireland, 
founded in the mid-1960s. The UVF was founded to combat republican violence 
and protect the Northern Irish constitutional status. A majority of its victims dur-
ing the Troubles were Catholic civilians and attacks were carried out in both the 
North and South. In the UK, the UVF is defined as a terrorist  organisation. The 
UVF called a ceasefire in 1994 and, despite several breaches, decommissioned its 
weapons in 2009.
Westminster: The Parliament of the United Kingdom as often referred to by par-
ties in Northern Ireland. 
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Appendix 3: Timeline of Important Events 
Pre-Troubles
1916  Easter Rising in Dublin acts as a starting point for a popular 
movement to liberate Ireland from Westminster rule. 
1919-1921  Irish War of Independence.
1921  Irish Free State established and Home Rule introduced to the 26 
counties in the South. The island is partitioned as the remaining 
six counties in the North-East remain under direct British rule. 
1921-1922  Irish Civil War.
1937  Republic of Ireland established.
The Troubles
1966  Loyalist paramilitary organisation, the UVF founded.
June 1968  Civil Rights Movement established.
August 1969  After extensive rioting in Northern Ireland, Operation Banner 
commences. British Forces are deployed to Northern Ireland to 
protect the Catholic population after rioting in Derry and Belfast 
results in several deaths and a large number of the Catholic 
population being forced to flee their homes.
December 1969  Ideological disagreements within the IRA result in a split into 
the Official IRA and Provisional IRA (IRA). 
September 1971 Ulster Defence Association (UDA) is formed. It quickly be-
comes the largest loyalist association in Northern Ireland. Few 
weeks later, the radically  unionist DUP is formed by leaders of 
the Protestant Unionist Party, with Ian Paisley at the helm. 
January 1972  Bloody Sunday in Derry. Several unarmed civilians shot by Brit-
ish paratroopers during a civil rights march. The British embassy 
in Dublin is subsequently burned to the ground by protestors in 
the Republic.
May 1972  The Official IRA announces a ceasefire. This marks the end of 
their military campaign during the Troubles. 
May 1974  Dublin and Monaghan bombings by the UVF leave 33 people 
dead and more than 300 injured.
Autumn 1974  Guildford and Birmingham pub bombings by the IRA in Eng-
land. A total of 22 British civilians and 4 soldiers killed. 
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July 1976  British ambassador to the Republic of Ireland, Christopher 
Ewart Biggs assassinated by the IRA in Dublin.
August 1976  Betty Williams and Mairead Corrigan become leaders of the 
Peace People, where Protestants and Catholics rally for peace 
together for the first time, after an IRA volunteer is shot dead by 
the British Army whilst driving, causing his car to spin out of 
control and kill three children. They are awarded the Nobel 
Peace Prize in 1977.
1981  Hunger Strikes in the Maze Prison by republican prisoners. A 
total of 10 of the hunger strikers die as a result, including 26-
year-old MP Bobby Sands. 
October 1984  Brighton Hotel Bombing. Five people killed by an IRA bombing 
at the hotel where the Conservatives are holding their annual 
conference. Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher escapes without 
injury.
November 1985  Anglo-Irish Agreement signed by British PM  Margaret Thatcher 
and Irish Taoiseach Garrett Fitzgerald. A month later, all the 15 
unionist MPs at Westminster resign in protest. 
January 1988 Meeting between Sinn Féin’s Gerry Adams and SLDP's John 
Hume marks the beginning of the Peace Process. 
December 1993 Joint Declaration signed by Irish Taoiseach Albert Reynolds and 
British Prime Minister John Major.
July 1994  The IRA announces complete ceasefire. The Combined Loyalist 
Military Command (CLMC), which represents all the loyalist 
paramilitaries, follows suit in October. 
December 1995  David Trimble elected as the leader of the UUP. 
February 1996  The IRA ends their ceasefire with London Docklands Bombing. 
In June, they destroy large parts of Manchester’s city  centre in 
the Manchester Bombing. 
April 1998  The Belfast Agreement is signed on Good Friday  at Stormont, 
the Northern Irish Parliament buildings. Referendums held in 
the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland a month later result 
in the Republic voting 94.4% in favour, whereas the North votes 
71.2% in favour.
June 1998  Northern Ireland Assembly  elections held. The UUP's David 
Trimble elected First Minister. SDLP’s Seamus Mallon elected 
Deputy First Minister. 
August 1998  Omagh bombing by a dissident group calling themselves the 
Real IRA kills 29 in the deadliest attack on civilians in Northern 
Ireland during the Troubles. 
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December 1999  Direct rule from Westminster ends. Power handed over to the 
Northern Irish Assembly.
October 2001 The IRA starts decommissioning its weaponry. Four years later, 
in 2005, they issue a statement that their armed campaign has 
ended.
October 2002 Northern Ireland Assembly  suspended over an alleged IRA es-
pionage ring at Stormont. Direct rule from Westminster reintro-
duced. 
2003 DUP wins majority  of Ulster votes, thus becoming the largest 
political party  in Northern Ireland for the first time. Sinn Féin 
becomes the biggest nationalist party with the UUP decreasing 
to become the second-largest  unionist party, and the SDLP the 
second nationalist party. Since the DUP refuses to go into gov-
ernment with Sinn Féin, the Northern Ireland Assembly and Ex-
ecutive remains suspended. 
March 2007 Following the 2006 St. Andrew’s Agreement where the DUP 
agree to enter into a power-sharing devolved government in 
Northern Ireland, elections to the Northern Ireland Assembly 
take place, which further increases the votes for both the DUP 
and Sinn Féin, compared to 2003. Subsequently, Ian Paisley and 
Gerry Adams meet face-to-face for the first time. Two months 
later, the new Northern Ireland Assembly meet and the Northern 
Ireland Executive is formed with Ian Paisley  as First Minister 
and Sinn Féin leader Martin McGuinness as Deputy First 
Leader. 
July 2007  British troops withdraw as Operation Banner ends. Official end 
of the Troubles.
Post-Troubles
August 2012 Decisions to only  fly the Union Jack on designated days on the 
Belfast City Hall sparks loyalist riots and the worst  sectarian 
violence in 15 years throughout the Province. 
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